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A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions,
in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered,
which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all
individuals (players) are equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous
opinion dynamics proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is
defined, such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can
not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different inclinations to change
opinion and different abilities in convincing the others. In this way, we obtain the so-
called “Stubborn individuals and Orators” (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant
et al. model, in which the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals.
We explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose
further generalizations that can be implemented.
Keywords: Sociophysics; opinion dynamics; game theory.
1. Introduction
The last years have seen an increasing interest in the physics community for the
description and modeling of social systems. In particular, Monte Carlo simulations
have become an important part of sociophysics 1,2, enlarging the field of interdisci-
plinary applications of statistical physics. Most of the sociophysics models, such as
that by Deffuant et al., that by Hegselmann-Krause, and the Sznajd model 3,4, deal-
ing with opinion dynamics and consensus formation, have the limit of considering
that the individuals in a society are all equals. Conversely, an important feature of
any real system, to be considered in the modeling of social system, is the presence
of individuals with different inclinations to change idea 6, as well as individuals with
different abilities in convincing the others.
In this paper we focus on the model proposed by Deffuant et al. 5, showing how the
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standard version of the model can be derived from basic principles in the framework
of game theory. Moreover, in the context of game theory, the model can be easily
generalized in different directions to take into account of the presence of individuals
with different characteristics. In particular, we show how the introduction of a dis-
tribution of the individual inclinations to change and of the ability to convince the
others, that produces what we have named the Stubborn Individuals and Orators
(SO) model, can affect the opinion dynamics of a social group.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the standard socio-
physics models, in particular the model by Deffuant et al. In Section 3 we propose
a way to derive models of opinion dynamics in the framework of game theory. The
method we propose is based on a set of basic assumptions on the characteristics of
the individuals (the players of the game) and on the payoffs for each of the possibile
actions, and on the idea of Nash equilibrium for games with perfect information.
We show how some simple models, including the model by Deffuant et al. can be
derived. We then consider the SO model, a generalized model considering agents
with different ability in convincing the others and with different inertia in changing
ideas. In Section 4 we explore the dynamics of the SO model by means of extensive
numerical simulations. In Section 5 we draw the conclusions and we outline further
possible generalizations and future developments.
2. Opinion formation models
The standard models of opinions dynamics 2,3,4,7 in sociophysics deal with N
individuals or agents. Each individual i = 1, ..., N is characterized, at time t, by an
opinion Si(t). The opinions can be integer numbers (for instance +1 or -1) as in
the Sznajd model 8, or real numbers in the range [0, 1] as in the model by Deffuant
et al. 5 and in the Hegselmann and Krause model 9. Each agent is in continuous
interaction with the other agents. The opinion of an agent changes under the
influence of the other individuals according to very simple deterministic rules. For
instance, in the Sznajd model on a two-dimensional square lattice, at each time step,
two randomly selected neighboring agents transfer their opinion to the six neighbors
if and only if the two agents of the pair share the same opinion. In the model by
Deffuant et al. 5, at each time step t, two randomly selected neighboring agents i
and j check their opinions Si(t) and Sj(t) to see whether an exchange of opinion
is possible. If the two opinions differ by more than a fixed threshold parameter
ǫ (0 < ǫ < 1), called the confidence bound, both opinions remain unchanged. If,
instead, |Si(t) − Sj(t)| < ǫ, then each opinion moves in the direction of the other
as: {
Si(t+ 1) = Si(t) + µ[Sj(t)− Si(t)]
Sj(t+ 1) = Sj(t)− µ[Sj(t)− Si(t)]
(1)
with µ being a second tunable parameter (0 < µ ≤ 1/2). In the basic model, the
threshold ǫ is taken as fixed in time and constant across the whole population. In
particular, the value µ = 1/2 corresponds to the case in which the two opinions
take their average [Si(t)− Sj(t)]/2
5.
To see if and how a consensus emerges out of initially different opinions, the
models are usually started with a random initial distribution of opinions. The
dynamics is followed until the system reaches an equilibrium state characterized
by the existence of one or several opinion groups, according to the value of the
control parameters of the models. For instance, the basic Sznajd model with random
sequential updating always leads to a consensus on a regular lattice of any dimension
D (and even if more than two opinions are allowed). In particular, one observes a
phase transition as a function of the initial concentration p of up spins. If p = 0.5,
then, at the end of the dynamics, half of the samples will have Si = +1 ∀i and
the remaining half will have Si = −1 ∀i. For p < 1/2 all samples end up with
Si = −1 ∀i, while for for p > 1/2 they all end up in the other attractive fixed point
Si = +1 ∀i
2. In the Deffuant model with µ = 0.5 instead, all opinions converge to
a single central one for ǫ > 1/2, while for ǫ < 1/2 different opinions survive, with
a number of surviving opinions that varies as 1/ǫ, as also confirmed by analytical
arguments 11.
3. Game theory and generalized models of opinion formation
The main idea behind any of the previous models is to simulate how the opin-
ions change in time by analyzing the very basic facts, that is: two individuals with
different opinions on a given topic meet and discuss, trying to convince each other,
or to find somehow a certain agreement about the topic. Of course, it is not obvious
that the two individuals do find a common agreement on the topic, this depending
basically on the specific characteristics of the two individuals (some of the individ-
uals in a real social system are easy to convince, other are less flexible, some are
good orators or distinguished for skills and power in convincing the others, while
some others are timid and reserved), and also on some external factors (the time
length and the strength of the interaction, the pressure of the external environment
or of the dominant ideas and fashions).
In this paper we propose to examine the basic interactions between the two
individuals within the framework of game theory 10. For this reason, from now on,
the two individuals will be also referred to as the two players. In particular, we
make use of the concept of Nash equilibrium for games with perfect (or complete)
information.
In general, a strategic game is a model of interacting decision makers. It consists
of:
• a set of N players or decision-makers;
• for each player i (i = 1, ..., N), a set of possible actions A = {a, b, c, ...};
• for each player, preferences over the set of action profiles (i.e. the list of all
the players’ actions).
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One way to describe the player’s preferences is to specify for each possible pair of
actions, the action the player prefers, or to note that the player is indifferent between
the actions. Alternatively one can represent the preferences by a payoff function,
which associates a number with each action, in such a way that actions with higher
numbers are preferred. More precisely, the payoff function u represents a player’s
preferences if, for any couple of actions a and b in A, u(a) > u(b) if and only if the
player prefers a to b. A simple example can be that of a person that is faced with
three vacation packages, to New York, Paris and Venice. She prefers the package
to Venice to the other two, which she regards as equivalent. Her preferences can be
represented by any payoff function that assigns the same number to New York and
Paris, and a higher number to Venice. For example, we can set u(a) = u(b) = 0 and
u(c) = 1, where a, b, c represent, respectively, the three packages. The fundamental
hypothesis in game theory is that each player tries to maximize her benefit. This
is usually called the hypothesis of rational choice, and means that, in any given
situation, the decision-maker chooses the member of the available subset of A that
is best according to her preferences. Moreover, the strategic games considered here
deal with situations in which actions are chosen once and for all (whereas there
are games, named extensive games, allowing for the possibility that plans may be
revised as they are carried out 10). In the example above, the decision-maker will
decide to go to Venice. In this simple example, we have only one decision-maker
choosing an action from a set A, and caring only about this action. In the general
case (that is of interest in this article), some of the variables that affect a player are
the actions of other decision-makers, so that the decision-making problem is more
challenging than that of an isolated player. The typical example is firms selling an
item and competing for business. Each firm controls its price, but not the other
firms’s prices. Each firm cares however, about all the firms prices, because these
prices affects its sales. How should a firm choose its prices in such a case ? In this
case, the best action for any given player depends in general on the other players’
actions. So when choosing an action, a player must have in mind the actions the
other players will choose. That is, she must form a belief about the other players’
actions. On what basis can such a belief be formed ? We consider here games in
which each player’s belief is derived from her past experience playing the game,
and this experience is sufficiently extensive that she knows how her opponents will
behave. No one tells her the actions the opponents will choose, but her previous
involvement in the game leads her to be sure of these actions. These are called
games with complete information, since in such games each player knows all the
details of the game and of its elements.
In summary, in the strategic games we consider, there are two different com-
ponents. First, each player chooses her action according to the model of rational
choice, given her belief about the other players’ actions. Second, every player’s be-
lief about the other players’ actions is correct. These two components are embodied
in the following definition of Nash equilibrium for such games 10,12:
• A Nash equilibrium is an action profile a∗ ≡ (a∗1, a
∗
2, ..., a
∗
N ) - where a
∗
1 denotes
the action chosen by player 1, a∗2 the action chosen by player 2 and so on-, with
the property that no player i can do better by choosing an action different
from a∗i , given that every other player j adheres to a
∗
j .
This definition implies neither that a strategic game necessarily has a Nash
equilibrium, nor that it has at most one. In general, some games have a single
Nash equilibrium, some possess no Nash equilibrium and others have many Nash
equilibria. A Nash equilibrium corresponds to a “steady state” of the system: if,
whenever the game is played, the action profile is the Nash equilibrium a∗, then no
player has a reason to choose any action different from her component of a∗. In
practice, there is no pressure on the action profile to change. Expressed differently,
a Nash equilibrium embodies a stable “social norm”: if everyone else adheres to it,
no individual wishes to deviate from it. The second component of the theory of
Nash equilibrium (that the players’ beliefs about each other’s actions are correct)
implies, in particular, that two players’ beliefs about a third player’s action are
the same. For this reason, the condition is sometimes said to be that the players’
“expectations are coordinated” 10.
The situations to which we wish to apply the theory of Nash equilibrium is
the process of decision making in the formation of an opinion. We simulate the
elementary interaction between individuals in a society by means of a strategic
game. Then, we get a model of opinion formation, by iterating the game many
times, i.e. by choosing at each time step a group of individuals and allowing them
to play the game. In particular we assume that each game is played by only two
players (N = 2), since here we limit to the particular case in which the dynamics
of opinion formation is based on the continuous interaction between couples of
individuals. (This is not always true. There are many real situations in which
the elementary process of opinion formation is based on the mutual interaction of
groups of more than two individuals. Nevertheless, our ideas can be generalized to
games with N > 2). We suggest a list of different possible games, the difference
being in:
1. the number and kind of actions that one individual can choose from;
2. the characteristics of the two individuals.
For instance, in the simplest model (defined in Subsection 3.1), we assume that the
individuals playing the game are all equals and can choose between two possibilities,
either to mantain or to change their opinion. In the following, more complex models,
we consider more than two actions for each player to choose from (e.g. introducing
the possibility that the two players find an agreement). Moreover, we introduce a
way to take into account that in a social group there are individual with different
skills and abilities.
Before moving to the descriptions of the models and their equilibrium we want
to stress that interactions in real social systems do not in general correspond exactly
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to the idealized setting described above (rational choice and complete information).
For example, in some cases, the players do not have much experience with the game.
In some other cases it could be useful to introduce non-rational players. Whether
or not the notion of Nash equilibrium is appropriate in any given situation is a
matter of judgment. In some cases, a poor fit with the idealized setting may be
mitigated by other considerations. For example, inexperienced players may be able
to draw conclusions about their opponents’ likely actions from their experience in
other situations, or from other sources. Ultimately, the test of the appropriateness
of the notion of Nash equilibrium is whether it gives us insights into the problem
at hand, that is to develop models of opinion formation.
3.1. Game I
In the most basic case, each of the two players of the game (named, from now on,
player A and player B) can choose between two different actions: to mantain or to
change opinion. As in any game we need to fix the actions’ payoffs u. The payoff,
for a player, is the function of her and the other player’ actions. Of course, each
player wants to convince the other one that her opinion is correct; on the other
hand she does not want to accept easily the other player’ opinion. Therefore, for
each player, we fix the following payoffs:
• u=+a if the other player changes her opinion
• u=+b if the player keeps her opinion
• u=-b if the other player keeps her opinion
• u=-a if the player changes her opinion
where a, b ∈ ℜ and 0 < b < a. We take b < a, since we assume that a player gets
the greatest satisfaction when is able to convince the opponent. Of course, this is
just an hypothesis so that, in principle, also the choice b > a would be an equally
valid possibility. More in general, we should consider four different numbers for the
payoffs, respectively: a > 0, b > 0, c < 0 and d < 0. Here, for the sake of simplicity,
we assume c = −b and d = −a. In table 1, we report the payoff u for players A and
B, for each of the strategies (action profiles). The two tables can be thought as two
Table 1. Game I: payoffs’ tables for player A and player B
PAYOFFS FOR A
B changes B keeps
A changes 0 -a-b
A keeps +a+b 0
PAYOFFS FOR B
B changes B keeps
A changes 0 a+b
A keeps -a-b 0
matrices MA, MB, whose entry mij represents the payoff, respectively for players
A and B, when A chooses the strategy i and B chooses the strategy j. E.g., mA12
(mB12) is the payoff for player A (player B) when A chooses the action change and
B chooses the action keep. Such a payoff is obtained by considering that player A
is in the following condition: she changes her opinion, while the opponent mantains
her opinion, therefore mA12 = −a − b. On the other hand, player B mantains her
opinion while the opponent changes her opinion, so that mB12 = +a + b. With the
same method we obtain the payoff for all the situations. The two matrices are:
MA =
(
0 −a− b
+a+ b 0
)
MB =
(
0 a+ b
−a− b 0
)
(2)
After creating the game, we want to foresee the actions that will be taken by the
two players. It is easy to prove that the game has a single Nash equilibrium in
(2,2), i.e. when both players choose the strategy keep. In fact, if we fix that B
chooses keep, then the player A can choose between a negative payoff −a − b or
0. Therefore she chooses the payoff 0, that corresponds to the strategy keep. In
the same way, the player B chooses keep if we fix that A chooses keep. Therefore,
neither player gets a greater payoff modifying her strategy, if the other player does
not change her own. Consequently, two players of game I will always mantainin
their own opinion, never reaching an agreement. In conclusion, a model of opinion
dynamics, in which at each time step a couple of individuals is chosen at random
among the N individuals and play game I, will produce no time evolution: every
individual will mantain the initial opinion.
3.2. Game II
We now introduce a new possibility: the agreement. This means that the two
players can decide to change their own opinion with an intermediate one (not the
initial opinions, nor the intermediate one needs to be better specified here). At this
point we need to fix the payoff for the two new possible actions, considering that a
player gets a certain satisfaction if she is able to shift the opponent’s opinion to an
intermediate one. We fix the following two new payoffs:
• u=+c if the other player changes her opinion with an intermediate one
• u=-c if the player changes her opinion with an intermediate one
where c ∈ ℜ and c < a. In table 2 we represent the payoffs for the various action
profiles. The two matrices for the new conflicting opinion game are:
MA =

 0 −a− b −a+ c+a+ b 0 +b+ c
+a− c −b− c 0

 MB =

 0 a+ b a− c−a− b 0 −b− c
−a+ c +b+ c 0


(3)
Notice that in this game, as in the previous one, the two matrices are trivially related
since MA = −MB. The game has a single Nash equilibrium in the point (2, 2).
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Table 2. Game II: payoffs’ tables for player A and player B
PAYOFFS FOR A
B changes B keeps B agrees
A changes 0 -a-b -a+c
A keeps +a+b 0 +b+c
A agrees +a-c -b-c 0
PAYOFFS FOR B
B changes B keeps B agrees
A changes 0 +a+b +a-c
A keeps -a-b 0 -b-c
A agrees -a+c +b+c 0
This means that, although the two players have, in principle, also the possibility
of finding an agreement, they choose the strategy of mantaining their own ideas.
Finally, the outcome of a model of opinion dynamics based on game II, would not
produce results different from the trivial results of the model based on game I, i.e.
no dynamics at all.
3.3. Game III
In the two previous games we have not taken into account the distances between
the two players’ opinions. Obviously, two individuals with close enough opinions
can reach easier the agreement than two people with very different opinions. This
has led to the introduction of the confidence bound mechanism in the model by
Deffuant et al. (see Section 2). Hence, it can be useful also here, in the context of
strategic games, to introduce a distance d between the opinions of the players, and
a corrective d-dependent term that makes the agreement easier in the game when
d is smaller. We fix the following payoffs:
• u=+a if the other player changes her opinion
• u=+b if the player keeps her opinion
• u=-b if the other player keeps her opinion
• u=-a if the player changes her opinion
• u=+c+1/d if the other player changes her opinion with an intermediate one.
• u=-c+1/d if the player changes her opinion with an intermediate one
where d ∈ ℜ, and d > 0. Notice that, if the two conditions c+ 1
d
> a and −c+ 1
d
> a
are valid, then both players get a greater payoff by choosing the strategy to agree.
The two conditions are both verified if d < 1
a+c . The payoffs’ matrices for the game
are:
MA =

 0 −a− b −a+ c+
1
d
+a+ b 0 +b+ c+ 1
d
+a− c+ 1
d
−b− c+ 1
d
2
d

 (4)
MB =

 0 a+ b a− c+
1
d
−a− b 0 −b− c+ 1
d
−a+ c+ 1
d
+b+ c+ 1
d
2
d

 (5)
It is easy to prove that this game has two different equilibrium points. In fact:
when d ≤ 1
b+c , there is a Nash equilibrium in (3,3).
when d ≥ 1
b+c , there is a Nash equilibrium in (2,2).
If we define the confidence bound ǫ as the following function of the game parameters:
ǫ =
1
b+ c
(6)
an opinion model based on N individuals playing in randomly chosen couples game
III, coincides exactly with the model by Deffuant et al. (with µ = 0.5) 5, discussed
in Section 2. In fact, we can assume that the opinions are real numbers in the
range [0, 1], as in the model by Deffuant et al., and we can start the N individuals
with a uniform random distribution of opinions. We then fix the three parameters
a, b, c, that is equivalent to fixing a value of the confidence bound ǫ (a tuning of the
parameters a, b, c allows to have ǫ varying in the range [0, 1]), while the distance
d depends on the two players’ opinions and changes each time the game is played.
Finally, the resulting model is the following. At each time step, two randomly
chosen individuals play game III. When the distance d between the two opinions is
smaller than the confidence bound in Equation (6), then the two individual shift
their opinions to the average one otherwise they keep their own opinions. This is
nothing else than the model by Deffuant et al.
3.4. Game IV: The SO model
In the previous models, the individuals are considered all equals. They can have
different opinions, but they have the same way to interact (i.e. in our framework, to
play the game). Actually, this is far from being true in any real case. What makes
the world interesting is the diversity of characters and behaviours we encounter. In
particular, in a real social system, there are stubborn individual, i.e. individuals
that do not change their own opinion easily, as well as people that change their
opinion very easily. Moreover, there are orators, i.e. individuals with a certain
influence in group processes and a well known ability in convincing the others 13, as
well as individuals that are not good in convincing the others. In order to take this
into account in our models of opinion formation, we introduce two new variables,
so that every individuals in our model is characterized by two values, the former
representing the oratory ability and the latter representing the stubbornness of a
person. We assume that each player is characterized by a couple of real numbers
p, q ∈]0, 1[ (the so-called characteristic parameters of the individual), where the first
variable, p, represents the probability for a player to convince the opponent, and the
second value, q, is the probability that a player keeps her own opinion. Considering,
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as in the previous cases, a game with only two players, A and B, we assume that pA,
qA and pB, qB are the characteristic parameters of the two players. Obviously, in
the new game, the payoffs for each player should also depend on the four numbers
pA, qA, pB, qB . This can be easily understood in the following way. Let us consider
the action “A convinces B” and suppose to iterate the game n times (with n≪ 1).
In n steps, the expected total payoff of A is naP , where a is the payoff for the same
action in the previous game, and P is the probability that A convinces B. The latter
is the product of pA, the probability that A is able to convince, and 1− qB, that is
the probability that B let himself to be convinced. Therefore, for every step A has
a mean payoff equals to apA(1− qB). In a similar way we obtains the payoffs for all
the other actions. Furthermore, we consider a distance-dependent term as in model
III: since the average value of the payoffs is one fourth of that in the previous game,
we choose 14d as corrective term. Finally, the two matrices representing the payoffs
for A and B are the following:
MA =


a(P −X) −aX − bY cP − aX + 14d
bQ+ aP b(Q− Y ) bQ+ cP + 14d
aP − cX + 14d −cX − bY +
1
4d c(P −X) +
1
2d

 (7)
MB =


a(X − P ) aX + bY aX − cP + 14d
−bQ− aP b(Y −Q) −bQ− cP + 14d
cX − aP + 14d cX + bY +
1
4d c(X − P ) +
1
2d

 (8)
where we have set P = pA(1 − qB), Q = qA(1 − pB), X = pB(1 − qA) and Y =
qB(1−pA). The Nash equilibrium of the game changes as a function of the distance
d:
if d ≤ D(pB, qA) and d ≤ D(pA, qB), then there is a Nash equilibrium in (3,3);
if d ≥ D(pB, qA) and d ≥ D(pA, qB), then there is a Nash equilibrium in (2,2);
if d ≥ D(pB, qA) and d ≤ D(pA, qB), then there is a Nash equilibrium in (2,3);
if d ≤ D(pB, qA) and d ≥ D(pA, qB), then there is a Nash equilibrium in (3,2);
where we have defined the two following functions:
D(pB, qA) =
1
4[bqA + cpB − (b+ c)qApB]
D(pA, qB) =
1
4[bqB + cpA − (b+ c)pAqB]
(9)
The game we have proposed has three main differences with respect to the basic
interaction mechanism in the model by Deffuant et al.:
1. It is possible that a player chooses the strategy “agreement” while the other
player chooses the strategy “keep”. This is not possible in the Deffuant et
al. model.
2. The largest distance that allows for the agreement (confidence bound) depends
on the characteristic parameters of the couple of players.
3. The shifting of the two players is in general different, so that it is necessary
to introduce two different variables, µ and ν (one for each player), to indicate
how much the two player shift their opinions.
If we indicate by SA(t) and SB(t) the two opinions at the time t, we can write
the time evolution as:{
SA(t+ 1) = SA(t) + µ[SB(t)− SA(t)]
Sj(t+ 1) = SB(t)− ν[SB(t)− SA(t)]
{
0 < µ < 0.5
0 < ν < 0.5
(10)
where µ is a function of pA and qB, while ν is a function of pB and qA. To deter-
mine the functions µ(pA, qB) and ν(pB, qA) we notice that they should obey to the
following obvious conditions:
∂µ
∂pA
> 0;
∂µ
∂qB
< 0;
∂ν
∂pB
> 0;
∂ν
∂qA
< 0; ∀pB, qB, pA, qA ∈]0, 1[ (11)
For instance, the first two conditions state that µ(pA, qB) should be an increasing
function of pA and a decreasing function of qB. One possibility is to choose the two
following functions:
µ(pA, qB) =
pA(1− qB)
2
ν(pB, qA) =
pB(1− qA)
2
(12)
Such a choice is in perfect agreement with the contraints 0 < µ < 0.5 and 0 <
ν < 0.5. Finally, we note that, if d ≤ D(pA, qB), then player B chooses the action
“agreement” whatever is the strategy choosen by A. Analogously, if d ≤ D(pB, qA),
then player A chooses to agree whatever is the strategy choosen by B. Therefore,
the strategic game we have proposed can be resumed in the definition of the two
following functions:
µ(pA, qB) =
{
pA(1−qB)
2
0
if d ≤ D(pA, qB)
if d > D(pA, qB)
(13)
ν(pB , qA) =
{
pB(1−qA)
2
0
if d ≤ D(pB, qA)
if d > D(pB, qA)
(14)
In conclusion the “stubborn individuals and orators” (SO) model we propose, based
on the strategic game IV, is the following. The model is fixed by choosing the values
of the three control parameters a, b, c (that is equivalent to choose a value of the
confidence bound ǫ in the Deffuant et al model). The distance d depends on the
two players’ opinions and changes each time the game is played. The N individuals
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are, as usually, started with a random distribution of opinions in the range [0, 1].
Moreover, each player i (i = 1, 2, ...N) is now characterized by two variables, the
characteristic parameters pi and qi, distributed among the players according to two
given distribution functions: F1(p) and F2(q). At each time step, two individuals,
let say A and B, are chosen at random and interact by playing the game. The
results of the game depends on the distance d between the two players’ opinions
and on the characteristic parameters pA, qA, pB, qB. The two players’ opinions after
the interaction (i.e. after the game) are shifted according to Equations (10), where
the values of µ(pA, qB) and ν(pB, qA) are calculated through Equations (13) and
(14), and through the functions in Equation (9). In particular, notice that, when
d > D(pA, qB), µ is equal to zero and the opinion of player A remains unchanged:
SA(t + 1) = SA(t). Analogously, when d > D(pB, qA), ν is equal to zero and
SB(t+ 1) = SB(t). Finally, the opinion dynamics model (the SO model) based on
game IV, consists in iterating this procedure at each time steps.
4. Montecarlo simulations of the SO model
In this Section we turn our attention to the numerical simulation of the dynamics
of the SO model. As shown in the previous section, the model depends on three
different parameters a, b, and c. The three parameters are not independent. In fact
a does not appear explicitly in Equations (9), and plays the role of a normalization
parameter, being only necessary to fix the maximum value of b and c (since we have
assumed that b < a and c < a. Consequently, the number of parameters can be
reduced by fixing the value of a and by considering the two normalized parameters:
β = b/a γ = c/a (15)
By definition, we have 0 < β < 1 and 0 < γ < 1. From Equations (12), we can
notice that the mean value of µ and of ν is equal to < µ >=< ν >= 18 . Hence, if
we suppose that the satisfaction of a player is a linear function of the shifting, then
we can assume γ = 18 . In this way, the only independent parameter is β, since there
are no reasons to fix a particular value for the satisfacion of a player to mantain the
opinion.
Finally, in the numerical simulation we investigate the behaviour of the model
for γ = 18 and for different values of β. In particular, we consider a population of
N agents (N >> 1) with an initial (at time t = 0) heterogeneous distribution of
opinions (every opinion in the range [0,1] being equally probable). Each agent is
described by two characteristic parameters p and q. We assume that p and q are
uniformly distributed in the range ]0, 1[, i.e. that the two distribution functions
F1(p) and F2(q) are equal to a constant. We evolve the system supposing that each
player has the same probability to interact with any other (a more realistic possibil-
ity, not considered here, would be that of imagining the individuals interacting on
a complex topology 7. As explained in Section 3.4, at each time step, two randomly
chosen agents try to convince each other of their opinions: they decide whether to
change their opinion on the basis of the rules of game IV.
In Fig. 1, we show the number of large clusters, Nc, obtained at a fixed time
tf , as a function of β. A cluster is a group of people that share the same opinion.
In the figure we consider only large clusters, i.e. clusters whose size is larger that
10% of the total population. We have considered N = 500 and tf = 5 × 10
5 time
steps. Each of the points reported in the figure has been obtained as an average
over 30 different realizations for the same value of β. We observe that Nc is an
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Fig. 1. SO model with N = 500, γ = 1/8, β variable, and a uniform distribution of initial opinions
and of the individual characteristic parameters p and q. The number of clusters with a size larger
than 0.1N at time tf = 5× 10
5 is shown as a function of the parameter β.
increasing function of β. This is an obvious consequence of the model: in fact,
β represents the payoff (normalized to a) of a player if she mantains her opinion.
Hence, an increasing value of β causes in a player a natural inclination to find
the agreement only with players with similar opinions, and therefore an increasing
number of cluster. On the contrary, for small β, the players tend to change their
opinions creating immediately a small number of clusters. As a further step, we
have checked numerically whether the asymptotic state of the opinion distribution
changes as a function of β. The simulations confirm the tendency of the system
to reach a final equlibrium with a single large cluster of opinions for any value
of β in [0,1]. The time to reach the equilibrium depends strongly from β and less
from the different realizations of initial conditions. In the Fig. 2 we show the typical
dynamical evolution for the case β = 0.8. In each panel we plot the agents’ opinions
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for six different times. For t > 5× 106 we notice the presence of a few small groups
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Fig. 2. SO model with N = 500, γ = 1/8, β = 0.8, a uniform distribution of initial opinions
and a uniform distribution of the individual characteristic parameters p and q. We report the
distribution of opinions among the 500 agents at six different times: t1 = 2 × 106, t2 = 4 × 106,
t3 = 6× 106, t4 = 8× 106, t5 = 1× 107, t6 = 1.2× 107.
of opinions and a single large cluster containing about 96% of the total population,
Similar results are obtained for other realizations of the initial conditions and for
different values of β.
The presence of a single large cluster, observed at large times in the simulations,
is a consequence of the all to all interactions (any couple of players is allowed to
interact in this version of the model). If we analyze the first of equations (9), we
notice that D(pB, qA) takes only positive values because:
bqA + cpB − (b+ c)qApB > 0 ⇔
b
pB
+
c
qA
> b+ c (16)
is true ∀pB, qA ∈ (0, 1) Analogously, D(pA, qB) is positive for any value of pA and
qB. This implies the existence, for any choice of the parameters, of a positive
distance of opinions for which the agreemeent is possible. When we start the agents
with a heterogeneous opinion distribution, for any given player i, it is certainly
possible to find another player that can find an agreement with i. If we iterate the
game IV for a long time, then there is a large probability that all the players reach
a common agreement. Furthermore, if we consider an agent with an opinion next
to 1, she has a larger probability to play with another agent with a opinion lower
than her. The same reasoning can be applied to an agent with an opinion close
to 0. Consequently, players with extreme opinions moves to central opinions and,
after a large time we observe a single large cluster with a central opinion (e.g. at
S ≈ 0.6 in Fig. 2). An exception to this behaviour are those players who avoid
the agreement with most of the other players. E.g. let us consider a player with
q = 12 . It can be easily proven that such a player chooses the strategy to agree only
when the distance with the opponent’s opinion is very small. In fact, in the best
case, i.e. when the opponent is an extremely good oratory characterized by p = 1,
a simple calculation gives D(p, q) = 0.08. Consequently, the distance d between
the two individuals should be smaller than 0.08 for these two individuals to find a
common agreement. If the dynamical evolution of opinions leads to isolate a player
with q = 12 at a distance larger that 0.08 from all the other players, such a player
will never move from her opionion. This is the reason why, after a long time, we
observe some (in general very few) isolated small clusters.
The tendency towards the formation of a single large cluster of opinions can be
quantified, at each time step, by the calculation of the Gini coefficient of the opinion
distribution. The Gini coefficient G is a measure commonly used in economics and
ecology to describe inequalities in the distribution of resource in a population 14,15.
In order to calculate the Gini coefficient of a generic empiric distribution one has
first to computer the Lorenz curve of the distribution. In our case, the Lorenz curve
of the opinion distribution is obtained in the following way. We divide the opinion
range [0,1] in M intervals (classes) of size ∆s. Class m, with m = 1, ...M , contains
nm individuals, namely those having an opinion in the range [(m−1)∆s,m∆s], with
the normalization
∑M
m=1 nm = N . The importance (richness) of a class is measured
by the number of individuals it contains: the reachest class is the one containing the
largest number of individuals. We then sort the classes in increasing order of nm
(starting from the classes with the smallest number of individuals, up to the richest
ones). Finally, in Fig. 3) we report (on the y-axis) the percentage of individuals,
as a function of the percentage of the classes considered, in increasing order of
importance (on the x-axis). This is the Lorenz curve of the opinion distribution.
We name such a function y = F (x). In particular, in Fig. 3) we consider the result of
a simulation of the SO model with N = 10000 individuals, and we report the Lorenz
curves F (x) obtained at four different times: t1 = 0, t2 = 1.5 × 10
6, t3 = 3 × 10
6
and t4 = 4.5 × 10
6. Notice that, at time t1 = 0, we have a uniform distribution
of opinions and, as expected, the Lorenz curve y = F (x) coincides with the line of
perfect equality y = x. For larger times, the Lorenz curve tends more and more
towards the Lorenz curve for the most heterogeneous distribution, that is F (x) = 0
for x ∈ [0, 1[, and F (x) = 1 for x = 1. This is eventually obtained when all the
opinions are in the same class, so that the opinion classe are inequally populated:
all of them are empty but a single one containing all the individuals. The Gini
coefficient, G, can be calculated by comparing the Lorenz curve y = F (x) of the
distribution, with the line of perfect equality y = x (the Lorenz curve of a perfectly
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Fig. 3. SO model with N = 10000, γ = 1/8, β = 0.8 and a uniform distribution of initial opinions
and of the individual characteristic parameters p and q. Lorenz curves of the opinion distribution.
The number of players is reported, as a function of the percentage of opinions (see text for details),
for four different times: t1 = 0, t2 = 1.5× 106, t3 = 3× 106 and t4 = 4.5× 106.
homogeneous distribution). G is defined graphically as the ratio of two surfaces:
the area between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve, and the area
between the line of perfect equality and the line of perfect inequality. One gets:
G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
F (x)dx (17)
By definition, the coefficient G ranges from a minimum value of zero, in the case
in which all the classes are equivalently occupied, to a maximum value of 1 in a
population in which every class except one has a size of zero, i.e. all the individuals
share the same opinion. In Fig. 4 we report the Gini coefficient as a function of time
for three different dynamical evolutions of the SO model, respectively corresponding
to the cases β = 0.02, β = 0.4 and β = 1. These three cases are a good sample of
the model behaviours, since by definition the parameter β is allowed to vary in the
range [0,1]. For each value of β considered, the system evolves towards a state with
a high Gini coefficient. We notice that:
1. The qualitative dynamical behaviour does not change with β. The system
reaches an asymptotic value of G which is very close to 1. This denotes the
presence of a single large cluster (and possibly few small clusters), for any
value of β. In practice, extreme heterogeneity is not allowed in the SO model.
2. The values of β influence the dynamics in two ways: A) the stationary value
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Fig. 4. SO model with N = 10000, γ = 1/8, a uniform distribution of initial opinions and a
uniform distribution of the individual characteristic parameters p and q. The Gini coefficient G is
reported as a function of time. The three curves correspond to three different values of β, namely,
from bottom to top, β = 1, 0.4, and 0.02.
of G is smaller for higher values of β; B) the converge dynamics is slower for
higher values of β.
The existence of a single large cluster in the numerical simulations of the SO
model is largely due to the fact that we have assumed a uniform distribution of the
individual characteristic parameters p and q. Other distributions of the parame-
ters, as for instance F1(p) and F2(q) gaussian distributed, are equally interesting
to be investigated. In particualar we expect that the model can give different re-
sults by tuning mean value and standard deviation of the gaussian distribution of
characteristic parameters.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how strategic game theory can find useful in the
modeling of opinion formations, as a way to simulate the basic interaction mecha-
nisms between two individuals. In particular, we have shown how various models
of opinion formation can be obtained by just changing the rules of the game, i.e.
the number and the kind of actions an individual can choose from, and also the
very same characteristics of the individuals. In the context of one of the simplest
game considered we were able to derive, by basic principles, a well known model of
opinion dynamics, such as the Deffuant et al. model. Then, we have generalized
the Deffuant et al. model by introducing in the game social individuals with two
characteristic parameters, respectively representing different inclinations to change
Opinion formation models based on game theory.
opinion and different abilities in convincing the others. Such a game produce the
so called Stubborn Individuals and Orators (SO) model. We have investigated nu-
merically the dynamics of the SO model in the case of all-to-all interactions, and
in the simplest possible case of a uniform distribution of characteristic parameters.
In such a case the model converges to a single dominant opinion for any value of
the control parameters. This model can still be generalized by using different dis-
tributions of characteristic parameters, or by allowing the individuals to interact
only with the neigbours in a network. Many other models can be introduced in
the context of strategic game theory, so that we hope that our paper can stimulate
further research in the field of sociophysics.
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